Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
A Cross-Disciplinary Look At Scientific Truth:
What's The Law To Do?

2008

Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete
Knowledge
Frank C. Keil

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Frank C. Keil, Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete Knowledge, 73 Brook. L. Rev. (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol73/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 8

Getting to the Truth
GROUNDING INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE
Frank C. Keil†
One aspect of truth concerns knowing when to trust
others when one’s own knowledge is inadequate. This is an
ever more common problem in societies where technological
and scientific change seems to be constantly accelerating.
There is an increasing need to rely on the expertise of others
and consequently to know when others are more likely to be
offering an objective opinion as opposed to a biased one. Here, I
argue that there are systematic and early emerging cognitive
heuristics and biases that profoundly influence our patterns of
deference, our ways of assessing expertise, and our sense of
when testimony is to be trusted. For the most part, the power
and pervasiveness of these biases are ignored or greatly underappreciated. These biases and heuristics can both mislead and
inform our understanding and use of others’ expertise; it is
therefore critical that we acknowledge their presence and know
how to work with them.
As will be seen shortly, people tend to make serious
mistakes in their evaluations of both their own knowledge
and the complexity of systems. Even worse, when people do
recognize that their understanding is inadequate, they can
make surprising mistakes in guessing who the right expert is
to fill out the details. In other cases, however, adults and even
young children can accurately figure out where appropriate
expertise lies. The details of this story, as described later in
this paper, are central to any full account of how we know
when to trust others. We have many tools that can be used to
help decide when it is appropriate to defer to another’s area of
expertise and when it is better to have serious doubts;
unfortunately, we often do not use these tools effectively.

†
Professor of Psychology and Linguistics and Master of Morse College at
Yale University. Much of the research described in this paper was funded by NIH
grant- R37- HD023922 to Frank Keil.
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The issue of establishing trust will be considered in a
series of five sections. Part I will explore the problem of
unbounded causal complexity, namely, the need for ways to
construct explanatory gists of causal systems that are far too
complex for any one person to fully understand. Part II will ask
about the ability to assess the quality of one’s own knowledge
and will argue that there is a strong tendency for people to
overestimate the depth and quality of their explanatory
understanding of a wide range of devices and natural phenomena. Part III will consider a related phenomenon in which
people are shown to have misleading illusions of insight
when explanations are supplemented with certain kinds of
irrelevant, but nonetheless compelling, support. Part IV will
suggest that illusions of explanatory depth and illusions of
insight may be related to errors in underestimating just how
complicated various phenomena are, especially those related to
the social sciences. Part V will consider how people manage to
get by with incomplete knowledge, suggesting that there are
several cognitive tools and heuristics that are used to help fill
in the gaps in one’s own knowledge. Finally, Part VI will
discuss how all these factors converge to explain how people
are able to establish trust and what errors are likely to occur.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF UNBOUNDED CAUSAL COMPLEXITY

Virtually any phenomenon in the natural or artificial
world has seemingly unbounded levels of causal complexity.
Ask a simple question, such as what stem cells are and how
they work, and the answer can be expanded on in ever deeper
and more complex ways. Stem cells may initially be described
as cells that have the potential to become any one of the many
cell types within an organism. A request for more detail
may reveal broad classes of cell types that can be created (for
example, ectodermal, mesodermal, or endodermal). Deeper
answers can reveal ever more fine-grained descriptions of the
different cell types. Still deeper answers reveal how all these
cell types are related in a hierarchical structure. All of this
information can then be elaborated on in enormous detail with
respect to the signaling mechanisms that cause cells to
differentiate in one manner as opposed to another, mechanisms
that can involve intricate accounts of molecular pathways that
regulate various sets of genes. If one is driven to gain the
deepest explanation possible, one gradually gets exposed to
much of developmental biology and molecular biology, as well
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as areas of chemistry, physics, and even other more distant
fields.
The same holds for questions about the world of human
inventions, such as how helicopters fly, how drugs influence the
body, or how a resolution of patent dispute might influence the
economies of several nations. In all such cases it is quickly
apparent that no one person can possibly know the full answer
to each question. One must know how to seek out legitimate
experts and how to avoid illegitimate ones. One must also know
when experts are making a statement within their range of
competence as opposed to outside that range. All of us have
huge gaps in our explanatory understandings that we tolerate
because we think they are firmly grounded in legitimate
understandings in other minds, understandings on which we
can rely when necessary.
These issues are highly salient in the law. The courts,
for example, frequently allow the testimony of expert
witnesses, assuming that there are reliable ways to identify
such experts and use them to improve the quality of legal
proceedings and decisions. The complexity and distributed
nature of knowledge requires that we have well-worked-out
and reliable mechanisms for grasping the division of cognitive
labor and that we know how to identify appropriate areas of
expertise and appropriate experts within those areas. In
addition, we need to know when experts are likely to be more
or less trustworthy. The cognitive science of such processes is
critically relevant to evaluating how well such patterns of
deference, consultation, and trust work; yet it has been largely
neglected in the law.
II.

HOW WELL DO WE KNOW THAT WE DON’T
UNDERSTAND?

To assess how well people deal with causal complexity
and the need to consult others, one must first know when one is
in over one’s head. One must have a way of sensing when there
are gaps in one’s knowledge that make one’s understanding so
flawed that it is inadequate for use in a task. This problem of
knowing how little one knows occurs in every facet of life. A
student may not realize that she does not really understand an
explanation offered by a teacher; a businessman may not know
that he has misunderstood a critical clause in a contract; and
members of a jury may think they understand the details of a
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complex patent dispute when in fact they have overlooked a
critical underlying principle.
Most people are quite inept at estimating how well they
understand various everyday phenomena, showing a strong
tendency to assume they understand how the world works in
far more detail than they really do. We have called this effect
an “illusion of explanatory depth” (“IOED”).1 The IOED can be
quickly revealed in tasks where people are taught how to rate
causal understanding on a scale that ranges from one (virtually
no understanding beyond a vague sense of what a phenomenon
appears like) to seven (a full mechanistic understanding of
exactly how a device works or how a natural phenomenon
occurs). Even though people can be shown to clearly
understand the scale and use it correctly when rating sample
texts of explanations, they give much higher scores than they
should when asked to estimate their own explanatory
understandings.
The effect is the strongest for estimates of one’s causal
understanding. For example, when people are asked to rate
how well they think they understand how a helicopter flies,
they might give a rating of five or six. Yet we can show that
this rating is far too high by simply asking them to actually
write out, or verbally report, everything they know about how a
helicopter flies. After giving the fullest explanation they can,
people are again asked to rate their knowledge in light of that
explanation. Their ratings on this second occasion show a
sharp drop relative to their first ratings, with people routinely
evincing great surprise at how little they actually knew.
Matters get worse if they are asked a simple diagnostic
question (for example, how does a helicopter go from hovering
to moving forward?) and are then asked to re-rate their
knowledge in light of their ability, or inability, to answer that
question. People again show a considerable drop relative to
their initial rating and even to their second rating. Their
ratings stay low if they are shown a concise but detailed
explanation and asked to compare it to their own initial
understanding and then use that comparison as a basis for
assigning a score to their initial rating. In other words, people
consistently rate their initial guesses of how well they
1
Frank. C. Keil. Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality, 7
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 368, 368 (2003); Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The
Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 26 COGNITIVE
SCI. 521, 522 (2002).
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understood various phenomena as being far too high when
their real knowledge is put to the test.
These effects are substantial and happen for ratings of
understandings of both artifacts, such as helicopters, and
natural phenomena and systems, such as the workings of the
heart. In contrast, when asked to rate self-knowledge of facts
(for example, the capitals of relatively obscure countries) or of
procedures (such as how to make an international phone call)
or even of narratives (such as the plot of a well-known movie),
people tend to be much better calibrated, either being fully
accurate or overestimating the depth of their knowledge to a
much lesser extent.2
The selectivity of the IOED has strong implications for
drawing conclusions about when a person is likely to be
accurate or inaccurate with respect to claims about the quality
of their own knowledge. In some domains that do not require
much underlying causal structure, assuming that people are
acting in good faith, they are likely to be quite accurate. In
others, however, such as ratings of causal explanatory
understanding, even the most sincere and trustworthy people
are likely to systematically overestimate what they really
know. The extent of the IOED can be quite remarkable even for
extremely common everyday objects. In one series of recent
studies people were shown sets of simple drawings of bicycles.
One drawing was correct while others had the chain connected
to sprockets on both wheels in a manner that would make
steering impossible or had the chain disconnected from the
drive wheel. Adults had great difficulty picking out the correct
drawing from among three incorrect ones, even though they all
said they were familiar with bicycles and often rode them. They
showed the same patterns of major errors when shown bicycle
frames of which only one could functionally work. Even
members of an active bicycle club made substantial numbers of
errors.3 The commonplace nature of some devices does not
assure that people will know how well they understand them.
Indeed, in at least some cases, high familiarity may breed an
especially high overconfidence. It may be that when someone
can easily use something, he or she confuses that sense of ease
with a sense of causal understanding.

2

Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1, at 533.
Rebecca Lawson, The Science of Cycology: Failures to Understand How
Everyday Objects Work, 34 MEMORY & COGNITION 1667, 1671 (2006).
3
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Experts may also fall prey to the IOED in their highly
refined areas of expertise. They may be somewhat better
calibrated,4 but, especially in areas that are at the boundaries
or “leading edge” of their own understanding, they may
sincerely believe that their understanding is deeper than it is.
This seems to be particularly true in cases where experts are
assessing how well they understand something, as opposed to
assessing how well they know how to do a procedure. In such
rarified areas, novices who rely on these experts may have an
especially difficult time evaluating an expert’s sincere, but
misguided, claims to having deep explanatory understanding.
As will be shown, however, even when a layperson is at such a
disadvantage in the relative size of the knowledge base, there
still are ways to adjust confidence in an expert’s testimony.
The IOED holds not only for assessments of one’s
knowledge, but also for assessments of knowledge in other
minds. Thus, recent work in our laboratory indicates that
ratings of how well others understand various phenomena or
devices are equally likely to be inflated. This has important
implications for knowing when and to whom one should defer.
Thus, even if one comes to a realization that one does not
understand, such a person may systematically overrate the
likelihood that another person does. The IOED also tends to get
stronger the less one knows or the younger one is.5 Thus, if a
person has a very high level of ignorance in an area, that
person is especially liable to not know when intellectual
outsourcing, namely, the reliance on others to provide complex
explanations, is needed.6 The greater extent of the phenomenon
in children raises questions about how to evaluate their claims
that they understand the reason for an action or event.
Similarly, children may be especially vulnerable to knowing
how well they have understood instructions or explanations
that are provided to them in a courtroom.
Across numerous studies, we see several converging
cognitive mechanisms that seem to set up and maintain an

4

Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1, at 554-55.
Candice M. Mills & Frank C. Keil, Knowing the Limits of One’s
Understanding: The Development of an Awareness of an Illusion of Explanatory Depth,
87 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 1, 23-24 (2004); Candice M. Mills & Frank C.
Keil, The Development of Cynicism, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 385, 389-90(2005).
6
See Justin Krueger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1126-30 (1999).
5
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especially strong IOED for explanatory understanding.7 People
tend to confuse higher-level functional glosses on a system
(such as knowing that turning a key starts a car) with lowerlevel mechanistic understanding (such as understanding the
complex starting circuitry in modern vehicles). They also tend
to confuse explanations that they are able to piece together in
an ad hoc manner with pre-stored explanations that they bring
to a situation, underestimating the degree to which they
generate explanations “on the fly” as opposed to bringing them
preformed to a situation. In addition, because people rarely
give exhaustive explanations, they have little practice in
evaluating explanations for completeness. These and other
factors help make the IOED robust and difficult to attenuate.
III.

FALSE EXPLANATORY INSIGHTS

There is a related cognitive bias to the IOED that
documents ways in which people can have a false rush of
explanatory insight when in fact none was actually achieved.
Certain kinds of information can be associated with
explanations that make them much more appealing than is
appropriate. One example with increasing relevance for the law
is the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”)
data to make claims about neural functions, or about
disruptions in neural function that might arise from various
forms of brain damage. Many court cases have allowed
extensive testimony in which fMRI findings are alleged to
explain why a person behaved as he or she did or why an
individual clearly has suffered brain damage arising from the
negligence of others.8 In many cases, fMRI findings might well
provide useful additional information in legal procedures, but
in many others they can have a powerful and often
unrecognized ability to mislead.
In particular, fMRI results can create a false sense of
insight when they are in fact completely irrelevant to the
7
See Frank C. Keil, Explanation and Understanding, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL
227 (2006); Frank C. Keil, Doubt, Deference and Deliberation: Understanding the
Division of Cognitive Labor, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 143, 163-64
(Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne eds., 2006); Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1,
at 552-56.
8
See Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A HighTech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251; Lewine et al., Objective
Documentation of Traumatic Brain Injury Subsequent to Mild Head Trauma:
Multimodal Brain Imaging with MEG, SPECT, and MRI, 22 J. HEAD TRAUMA
REHABILITATION 141 (2007).
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quality of an explanation in which they are embedded. Thus, it
can be more difficult to detect weak or flawed research when it
is accompanied by uninformative fMRI results than it is to
detect equally weak or flawed research without such results. To
demonstrate such an effect experimentally, one can present
adult experimental participants with one of four explanations,
which are created by varying the explanations along two
dimensions: whether the explanation is good or empty and
circular, and whether or not it contains irrelevant fMRI results.
Student participants clearly preferred the good explanations
to the empty/circular ones when there were no fMRI results
accompanying those explanations. In contrast, they found it
much more difficult to tell the good from the bad explanations
when they also contained the fMRI results, even though the
fMRI results were completely noninformative.9 Only highly
trained experts in cognitive neuroscience showed the same
abilities to discriminate good from bad explanations when they
were accompanied by neuroimaging results.10 The neuroimaging results were not particularly complicated; however, it
appeared that phrases such as “brain scans showed that” made
it much harder for most people to then evaluate that the brain
scans added no new information. Because the experts were
easily able to see the good from the bad experiments with the
neuroimaging results, we know that the neuroimaging really
did not add any new information of value.
It seems that we can gain misleading senses of insight
when studies are made more concrete through such means as
brain imaging, even when the imaging is irrelevant. In
deciding whether fMRI results should be admitted into
evidence, it is critical to carefully look at what additional
insights they really offer, as opposed to relying on simple
intuitions that the fMRI supplemented explanations seem
more “solid.” More broadly, neuroimaging certainly has an
important role to play in understanding behavior, but the
potential for abuse needs to recognized.11 When people try to
understand the many invisible factors leading to behaviors,
9

Deena Skolnick-Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience
Explanations, J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. (in press).
10
Id.
11
See generally Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On
the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233 (2006);
Jennifer Kulynych, Legal and Ethical Issues in Neuroimaging Research: Human
Subjects Protection, Medical Privacy, and the Public Communication of Research
Results, 50 BRAIN & COGNITION 345 (2002).
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such as a criminal act, there is a tendency to seize on any
claims about how the basis for such behaviors might be
physically instantiated. It seems likely that comparable effects
may be found for other alleged physical bases for behavior,
such as claims that there is “a gene” causing a certain
behavior.
In short, people can have rushes of insight as they learn
more about a phenomenon, but sometimes these rushes do not
correspond to real increases in understanding. In particular,
when people are offered information that is phrased in terms
of a lower, more concrete, level of analysis, they often will take
that information quite uncritically and think that it adds value
because it is lower level and not because it actually provides
any new explanatory information. Laypeople should be
especially vigilant when provided with explanations that shift
down levels in some kind of reductionist hierarchy, keeping in
mind that things often sound better than they really are when
such a shift occurs.
IV.

DO WE KNOW WHERE COMPLEXITY LIES BENEATH?

Another problem related to assessing truth concerns
estimating the complexity of various systems and phenomena.
Even if people were fairly accurate at sensing the degree of
comprehensiveness of their own knowledge, they might get into
considerable trouble because they do not understand the level
of complexity of a phenomenon; they assume that their
relatively simple understanding is all that is needed because
they underestimate the actual complexity of the phenomenon.
Difficulties here lead directly to problems of trust and
deference.
Knowing when we need to defer to another’s expertise is
intimately related to how complex we think the phenomenon
being explained is. If the phenomenon seems trivial and
relatively self-evident to any reasonably observant and
thoughtful person, then it may be inappropriate to bring in an
expert who might only muddy the waters rather than shed
insight. We can all envision such trivial cases. Suppose, for
example, a defendant drove through a school zone at 100 mph
and asked for clemency on the grounds that he didn’t know
that such a high speed posed a risk for school children. It is
reasonable to argue that there is no need for traffic experts to
be brought into such a case to testify that the risk level was
increased. Moreover, it certainly makes sense for the courts to
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exercise discretion in allowing people to testify as expert
witnesses. Without such discretion, it is easy to see how the
introduction of experts could lead to delaying tactics and
obfuscation in a courtroom.
Other cases, however, may seem far simpler than they
really are. In particular, experts on psychological mechanisms
have often been disallowed in the courts on the grounds the
expertise is simply “common knowledge” and that the alleged
expert has nothing to offer that a reasonable layperson does
not already know. For several decades psychological experts
have been excluded in cases abroad12 and in the United States.
One especially prominent recent case concerned the perjury
accusations against I. “Scooter” Libby. Libby’s defense team
wanted to bring in experts on memory to testify that it was
quite plausible that Libby could have misremembered past
events, rather than deliberately committing perjury.13 Judge
Reggie B. Walton, however, disallowed such experts partly on
the grounds that laypeople had accurate and detailed
understandings of the fallibility of memory; it was not clear
what additional insights could be added by “experts.”14
It is beyond the scope of this paper to document the
many complex features of the human memory system and how
they can cause behaviors that may surprise the layperson and
even be quite counterintuitive to lay theories of how memory
works. To use just one example, many people think that
memory is laid down almost like a videotape recording that
may become buried but is always present.15 Such a view grossly
underestimates the extent to which memories are constantly
being revised and reconstructed in ways that can completely
overwrite the earlier version. The public fascination with
“recovered memories” is one example of this bias. Although
12

See Andrew M. Colman & R.D. Mackay, Legal Issues Surrounding the
Admissibility of Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony, in CHILDREN,
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 46 (Noel K. Clark & Geoffrey Stephenson, eds., 1993); R.D.
Mackay et al., The Admissibility of Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony, in
ANALYSING WITNESS TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND OTHER
PROFESSIONALS 321 (Anthony Heaton-Armstrong et al. eds., 1999).
13
See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Richard L. Steinberg, Op-Ed., If Memory Serves,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at A14.
14
United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
Thomas Adcock, ‘Psychology in the Practice of Justice’ Conference Draws Together
Legal, Science Scholars, 237 N.Y. L.J. 20 (2007).
15
Seema L. Clifasefi et al., Setting the Record (or Video Camera) Straight on
Memory: The Video Camera Model of Memory and Other Memory Myths, in TALL TALES
ABOUT THE MIND AND BRAIN 60, 60-61 (Sergio Della Sala ed., 2007).
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laypeople often believe that there exist exact traces of
memories of childhood experiences that can be brought to light
with appropriate “excavations” by therapists, the experimental
evidence for such recoveries is minimal. Putting aside the
merits of Judge Walton’s decision, the question arises as to
whether judges might often be prejudiced against the
possibility of psychological explanations having a complexity
comparable to that which one might find in areas such as
biology or physics.
In adults, it is very difficult to know how to measure the
relative complexity of two domains, as complexity itself can
vary in so many ways. For example, if asked whether a full
explanation of superconductivity or face recognition is more
complicated, one could easily pick either alternative by
emphasizing different facets of the phenomena. Perhaps
superconductivity is more complicated because it requires a
particular kind of mathematics, or perhaps face recognition is
more complicated because it requires integration across several
different forms of mathematics as well as anatomy. Thus, it
may seem impossible to distinguish between claims that people
are biased to think of psychology as simpler than other sciences
and claims that psychology really is simpler. Recently,
however, studies have been conducted that suggest a cognitive
bias is at work.16
These studies rely on the assumption that such biases
might arise from very basic intuitions that emerge early in
childhood, intuitions that might gradually become weaker with
age by compensating knowledge. Thus, there might be a rough
and ready intuition that psychological phenomena are simpler,
an intuition that gets tempered with age through experience
with the complexity of actual psychological situations. To
examine this possibility, one study took a large number of
everyday phenomena in domains such as physics, biology and
psychology. The phenomena were pre-tested to find a subset
that adults judged as all about equal in complexity. For
example, the following “why” questions were judged to be
equally complex: How does a top stay spinning upright? How
does your skin heal after it has been cut? Why is it hard to
understand two people talking at once? Children, ranging in
age from five to fourteen years, were then asked to make
16
Frank C. Keil, Kristi L. Lockhart & Esther Schlegal A Bump on a Bump?:
Early Intuitions Concerning the Relative Difficulty of the Sciences (forthcoming).
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judgments about the complexity of these same selected
phenomena.17 As the age of children decreased, a stronger bias
emerged in which psychological phenomena were judged as
much simpler than those in the biological and physical
sciences.18 This pattern strongly suggests that the bias may
persist in adults, but in a reduced form. Moreover, it may reemerge in stronger terms in adults when they must also
evaluate several other complex factors at the same time, such
as in a legal case. Similarly, this pattern may emerge in time
pressured situations, rapid verbal exchanges, or under pressing
questions. Thus, even though the stimuli questions were
judged by adults to be of equal complexity, the psychological
ones may actually be more complex, with the difference being
masked by a latent bias that still persists in a weaker form
from childhood. It might be possible to show this remaining
difference in complexity by contrasting detailed expert explanations of psychological and natural science phenomena that are
judged to be of equal complexity by laypeople.
Children in these studies often attempted to explain
their intuitions by referring to the immediacy of psychological
states. They experienced them automatically and effortlessly,
and that feeling may be confused with a sense that the
phenomena are therefore simple. They also often said that
everyone could understand such phenomena, suggesting
something quite close to the “common knowledge” claims made
by judges. Common knowledge may, in fact, not be well
understood.
In short, it is not safe to assume that one’s novice
intuitions about the complexity of phenomena are always
accurate. There may be systematic biases that heavily distort
one’s intuitions into thinking some classes of phenomena are
much simpler than they really are. There is also the possibility
that other biases may create intuitions of greater complexity
than is warranted, although such patterns still remain to be
experimentally demonstrated. One such example might involve
a system that has a vast number of parts and seems hopelessly
complex, but which is suddenly rendered very simple when a
basic repeating pattern is pointed out. Some fractal patterns
can take on great simplicity when seen in such a light.

17
Note that all the questions were phrased in very simple terms that would
be readily understandable to young children.
18
Id.
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It would be extremely useful in legal cases to have a
greater awareness of complexity biases and to factor them in
when making decisions about whether to allow certain kinds of
expert witnesses. It does not follow that all claims of expertise
should be allowed, or even that all legitimate areas of expertise
are relevant to the case at hand; but it is evident that we do not
currently have in place sufficiently rigorous and systematic
ways of evaluating whether a phenomenon requires testimony
from experts in order for jurors and judges to act in a more
informed manner.
V.

GETTING BY WITH LESS

The story so far seems pretty discouraging. Normal
adults, as well as attorneys and judges, labor under several
cognitive biases that could powerfully influence trust and
deference. They overestimate their own explanatory understanding, they get false surges of insight from irrelevant
sources of seductive information, and they may have heavily
distorted senses of what phenomena are truly complex and
require expert assistance and deference to those experts. How
might these problems be addressed? There are two answers,
one arising from trying to instill a mindfulness about these
biases in the legal system, and the other arising from ways in
which complete novices do have tools at their disposal that
enable them to evaluate expert claims, even when they
understand very little about the details of those claims.
A.

Mindfulness

In the case of mindfulness, legal cases might well be
helped by a simple awareness not only of the fallibility of our
knowledge related judgments, but also of the details of how
those judgments are distorted. All parties in a legal proceeding
should constantly be asking if they might be systematically
overestimating not only their own understandings, but also
those of others. This might entail techniques to carefully
examine levels of understanding in ways that are thorough
without being badgering or intimidating. There may be a set of
heuristics that one could apply before making statements about
the depth of one’s own understanding or of that held by others.
For example, one might be required to write out complete
explanations of some facet of a phenomenon or to answer
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certain critical diagnostic questions posed by top experts in the
field.
Similarly, one should not assume that it is an easy
matter to ascertain whether an area of expertise is legitimate
or merely common knowledge. It would be a mistake to clutter
the courts with an endless parade of experts on every possible
topic, but it would be an equally large mistake to not try to
develop explicit sets of procedures for evaluating alleged areas
of expertise. If, for example, people have a tendency to succumb
to reductionist explanations, even when they are empty, it
might be possible to present them with examples of noninformative reductionist explanations to illustrate common pitfalls.
Alternatively, one could suggest that people specifically ask
what value is added when a new piece of information is
introduced at a different level of analysis; for example, asking
what predictions the new information now makes possible that
were previously impossible or more difficult before receiving
the new information. It is unclear what mindfulness strategies
may be most effective simply because research in this area is
relatively new. There is a great deal of cognitive science to be
done in this area as well, but the knowledge gained so far can
certainly suggest some guidelines.
B.

Implicit Tools for Evaluating Expertise

Everyone shares certain heuristics that can be brought
to bear to assess both the credibility and relevance of experts
and the appropriateness of judgments, heuristics that have
roots in early childhood. For example, young school children
are more likely to doubt the testimony of people whose
statements are self-serving. Thus, a person who claims to have
won a close race is more likely to be doubted than one who
claims to have lost the same race.19 This may seem blindingly
obvious, but it is not clear how often people are provided with
adequate information about the potential links between a
person’s testimony and their own motivational states. For
example, only recently have several major newspapers adopted
the practice of disclosing the funding sources behind new
discoveries in biomedical research. This practice undoubtedly
was influenced by studies showing, for example, that scientists
funded by pharmaceutical companies have quite different, and
19

Mills & Keil, The Development of Cynicism, supra note 5, at 389.
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usually much more company-self-serving, results than
scientists funded by government grants. Indeed, drugs have
been reported as twenty times more effective in supposedly
objective trials when the studies are funded by drug companies
as opposed to when they are funded by federal agencies.20 One
cannot rely on the researchers conducting such studies to
monitor themselves, as even the most ethical may unknowingly
introduce bias. Whenever information that has been gathered
by others is presented, it is important to know how that
information relates to the motivational states of others.
A second form of implicit knowledge relative to the
evaluation of expertise concerns having a sense that a domain
of knowledge is appropriate for expertise even when one does
not grasp most of the details of that domain. Here, we can
consider some forms of implicit knowledge that are very early
emerging in normal cognitive development and therefore
should be considered available to virtually all adult jurors.
There are, in fact, several distinct ways to enhance our
judgments of the legitimacy of expertise: whether the
properties being stressed are likely to co-occur in a domain,
whether a coherent domain is being discussed, whether there
are signs of deeper causal structure, and whether an
appropriate gist has been constructed. Each of these ways is
actively being pursued in research, but there are already
indications that laypeople also use these to evaluate expertise
in their everyday lives.
People will look at which property types are emphasized
in an explanation to support hunches about whether an avowed
expert is likely to be making sense. For example, all things
equal, someone who explains how a novel machine works by
stressing its color and the precise number of internal parts is
less likely to be a legitimate expert than one who stresses the
shape of the machine and the strength or fragility of specific
parts. In contrast, someone who is trying to explain the nature
of a novel plant might well focus on color and precise numbers
of parts of its anatomy.21 Even five-year-olds have some sense of
this difference and can use it to choose between experts.22
20
See Lisa A. Bero et al., Factors Associated with Findings of Published
Trials of Drug-Drug Comparisons: Why Some Statins Appear More Efficacious than
Others, 4 PLOS MED. 1001, 1006 (2007).
21
Frank C. Keil et al., Two Dogmas of Conceptual Empiricism: Implications
for Hybrid Models of the Structure of Knowledge. 65 COGNITION 137 (1998).
22
Id.
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Similarly, even preschoolers have a sense that it is more
sensible to talk about the overall function of novel artifacts
(such as machines and tools) than it is to talk in the same
manner about novel animals (for example, it makes more sense
to say what a new tool “is for” than it does for a new mammal).
Even children may have a sense to doubt expertise that
spans too diverse or broad areas of knowledge.23 Thus, if one
person claims to be an expert on ducks and swans, that person
is more credible as an expert than one who claims to be an
expert on ducks and lasers. All laypeople, as well as young
children, share a sense that it is more likely that one will be an
expert on areas of knowledge that are closer together in some
taxonomy of knowledge.24 Similarly, even children are sensitive
to the fact that it is more plausible for someone to be an expert
on a smaller class of entities at a lower level in a taxonomy (for
example, all ducks) than it is to be an expert on a larger class
at a higher level of a taxonomy (for example, all animals).25
These intuitions require some sense of the division of cognitive
labor in a person’s community and the idea that knowledge
clusters can be understood to form a kind of hierarchical
structure similar to that found in the academic organizational
charts of universities. Quite surprisingly, children as young as
five do have some sense of such a structure, which they extract
by looking at meaningful causal clusters in the world.
In addition, people can also sense when there are signs
of deeper causal structure and use those to guess whether one
is discussing a legitimate area of expertise. It is, for example,
quite obvious to young children that it makes much more sense
for there to be an expert on hunting dogs than on dogs with red
collars. Even though a child may know virtually nothing about
hunting dogs, he or she seems to engage in causal conjectures
that reveal a likely causal structure. For example, a child
might speculate that dogs that hunt would have better vision
and smell and that an expert might know all about how that
happened. For dogs with red collars, however, the child would
see that there were no comparable plausible speculations about
23

Keil et al., supra note 16.
Other work shows that children do have some sense of such taxonomies.
Frank C. Keil et al., Discerning the Division of Cognitive Labor: An Emerging
Understanding of How Knowledge Is Clustered in Other Minds, COGNITIVE SCI.
(forthcoming); Judith Danovitch & Frank C. Keil. Should You Ask a Fisherman Or a
Biologist?: Developmental Shifts in Ways of Clustering Knowledge, 75 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 918, 919 (2004).
25
Keil et al., supra note 24; Danovitch & Keil, supra note 24, at 927-28.
24
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causal generalizations that would follow from having a red
collar. Thus, even when one does not really understand a
domain, one can often use simple heuristics, such as causal
counterfactuals, to get a sense of whether there is likely to be
causal depth present worthy of expertise. These heuristics are
not perfect however and can fail when rating the relative
complexity of physical and psychological phenomena. A better
understanding is needed of when they can work and when their
usefulness is more limited.
Finally, there are indications that people understand
the difference between reasonable and unreasonable gists of
complex explanations and can use the difference to evaluate
experts as well as an area of expertise. They may be able to do
so without having much understanding at all of the details of
the explanation. For example, ongoing research in our
laboratory suggests that people can look at very general
structural principles of an explanation, such as how some
details are elaborated on by others, to guess at which is a good
gist. A good expert should be focusing on core concepts and not
on peripheral elaborations of a specific point. Someone who
does not really grasp a domain well may not know enough to
say much about the core concepts and may try to feign
expertise by going on about subdetails of one facet of a
phenomenon. Even laypeople, however, can sense or can be
trained to sense when this sort of excessive detail is occurring
and to start questioning expertise. There are some relatively
simple clues as to when someone is going into irrelevant details
as a way of trying to cover up ignorance of a central issue, and
these clues may be available to a wide range of observers with
quite modest knowledge of the area of alleged expertise.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Human cognition can cause both pitfalls and
opportunities in our efforts to get at the truth in a causally
complex world in which deference and trust are essential. The
pitfalls revolve around the ways in which individuals can be
quite poor at recognizing their own areas of weak understanding. We live under illusions of explanatory depth and we
have the same illusions about explanatory understanding in
others. We are further hindered by a tendency to be seduced
by a sense of false insight when we are presented with certain
ways of making phenomena more concrete, even when such
concreteness is nothing more than uninformative fMRI results.
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We may also introduce systematic distortions into our sense of
where the deepest causal complexities in the world arise, with
the result that we tend to underestimate the complexity of
psychological phenomena relative to most physical ones.
The opportunities to overcome these predispositions
arise from the surprisingly sophisticated ways in which all of
us, even young children, can use our intuitive senses of real
world causal structure and of the nature and purpose of
explanations to assess experts even when we have very modest
knowledge of an area of expertise. We can evaluate experts
(and judges) in terms of their self-interest. We can also
evaluate experts in terms of the reasonableness of the avowed
area of expertise, using such factors as the breadth and depth
of what they talk about and the ways in which they summarize
complex bits of information. All of these are quite recent areas
of research, but every sign is that cognitive science will soon
tell us a great deal more about both the illusions we labor
under and should be mindful of and about the ways in which
we use heuristics and implicit knowledge to have a good sense
of when and where to place our trust.
These new developments create a burden for cognitive
scientists to communicate the current state of this research
more clearly with those in the law, as well as a burden on those
in the law to recognize both our cognitive biases and our
surprising evaluative abilities. At present, we both overestimate and underestimate different aspects of people’s
cognitive capacities, and we do so in ways that may well impair
the manner in which trust should optimally function in the
courtroom.

